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Introduction
Peter Gerhart was an intellectual hedgehog. In three books on tort
law,1 property law,2 and contract law,3 he successfully accounted for
much of private law through the lens of a simple but powerful set of
ideas. According to Gerhart, private law rules often reflect how people,
as social and moral beings, do and should reason about choices they
make that involve other people’s well-being. Social moral reasoning is
“other regarding” and consists of “think[ing] appropriately about the
well-being of others when deciding how to behave.”4 In his terms,
thinking appropriately involves applying the Golden Rule (“Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you”5) behind a veil of ignorance.6 In more colloquial terms, when you are considering an action
that could harm another person, you should put yourself in their shoes
(while remaining in your own shoes), put aside personal biases and self†

Professor, University of California Berkeley Law School.

1.

Peter M. Gerhart, Tort Law and Social Morality (2010)
[hereinafter Gerhart, Tort Law].

2.

Peter M. Gerhart, Property Law and Social Morality (2014)
[hereinafter Gerhart, Property Law].

3.

Peter M. Gerhart, Contract Law and Social Morality (2021)
[hereinafter Gerhart, Contract Law].

4.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 1.

5.

Id. at 39.

6.

Id. at 43. The “veil of ignorance” concept was developed by John Rawls.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11 (rev. ed. 1999).
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interest, and imagine a conversation between the two of you to
determine how best to balance your competing interests in deciding how
to act. My impression is that Gerhart lived his life guided by this rule.
If everyone emulated him, it would be a much better world.
This paper will argue Gerhart largely achieves the goals he set out
for himself when he began this project over a decade ago, and that in
doing so he captures a melody of reasonableness that runs through
much of private law. Gerhart’s goal was to provide a unified account of
“how we think about” tort, property, and contract cases7 that is “conceptually coherent,” “determinate in its application,” and able to bridge
the divide between corrective justice and economic theory.8 Importantly, the “we” to whom Gerhart refers is more than lawyers and judges.
The “we” includes people going about their lives who the law instructs
to think appropriately about a decision that involves other people to
whom a duty to think appropriately is owed. Equally importantly, the
method is “determinate in its application,” but not because it is an
algorithm that can be applied mechanically to yield a demonstrably
correct result. The method is determinate in its application because it
provides a structured way for people to think about how to act appropriately when an action affects the well-being of another person, and
for judges to evaluate choices people make when a duty is owed to think
appropriately. Sometimes no specific choice will be dictated because
reasonable people could disagree about what is a reasonable choice.9
Part I begins with Gerhart’s account of parts of tort law and
property law that require people to act reasonably. He largely leaves to
the side parts of tort law and property law that cannot be explained in
these terms. Part II takes up where Gerhart leaves off by sketching
these parts of the law. He does not address power-conferring rules in
property law that make private-ordering possible. Particularly in
property law, these rules tend to be highly formal to facilitate exercise
of a power. They also generally allow people to exercise a power to
pursue their own goals without regard for the well-being of others. Nor
does Gerhart address equitable rules that sometimes excuse noncompliance with a power-conferring rule to prevent people from taking
unfair advantage of someone’s mistake or their vulnerability. While
these equitable rules are highly moralistic, they provide limited justice
and so tolerate a great deal of unreasonable conduct. Also largely
outside of Gerhart’s account are rules in tort law that privilege a harmdoer’s interest in liberty of action over a victim’s interest in freedom
from harm when harm is nonphysical, and particularly when harm is
7.

Id. at xii.

8.

See id. at xi–xii.

9.

Gerhart describes that these are choices made “across the community in
accordance with a set of values” that is reflective of the choices made by
individuals in “similar circumstances.” See id. at 62–64 (describing
“conflicting claims” by members of the community).
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purely economic. These rules also tolerate a great deal of unreasonable
conduct.
Part III turns to Gerhart’s account of contract law. Gerhart’s
account of tort law and property law assumes the traditional premise
that, insofar as private law is concerned, people are independent and
owe limited duties to others.10 Private law generally takes the existing
distribution of wealth and other sources of power and advantage as a
given. His account of contract law derives the traditional conclusion
from this premise, which is that when people make a contract, the
agreed exchange defines the obligations that they owe each other.11 He
argues that much of contract law can be understood as implementing a
requirement of reasonableness within the parameters of the agreed
exchange. I observe that while rules regulating contract performance
generally are amenable to this interpretation, the law of conditions and
the rules on contract formation are not. Part IV gives separate attention
to Gerhart’s proposal on contract interpretation, for it is an important
contribution to the literature on interpretation that stands alone.
Part V places Gerhart’s account of contract law in the landscape of
modern contract law theory alongside Peter Benson, Justice in
Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law.12 Gerhart and Benson have
very different aspirations for their accounts of contract law, and their
accounts differ greatly in scope and method. Still, their accounts
converge on several key points. They share the traditional premise that,
insofar as private law is concerned, people are independent and owe
limited duties to other people. They both draw the traditional conclusion from this premise that when people make a contract, the agreed
exchange defines the obligations they owe each other. They also both
agree that parties to a contract have a duty to treat each other reasonably within the parameters of the agreed exchange. This leads both
Gerhart and Benson to support progressive doctrines that most U.S.
courts reject, including a robust form of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing and use of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to police
boilerplate terms in form contracts.
While I largely agree with these prescriptions as a matter of policy,
I will argue that Gerhart’s and Benson’s accounts of contract law
overlook several points that undercut their arguments in support of
these progressive doctrines. Neither considers how supplementary
requirements for contract formation, like the statute of frauds and the
definiteness requirement, might extend the domain of independence and
limited duty into contract formation. Neither addresses the important
disagreement within contract law over whether the baseline contract is
10.

See infra Part I.

11.

See infra Part II.

12.

Peter Benson, Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract
Law (2019).
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the parties’ agreement in fact or terms in a writing the parties adopt as
an expression of their agreement. More generally, neither adequately
addresses the tension created by defining contract law as a domain of
reasonableness that lies within a larger domain in which people are
independent and owe limited duties to others.

I. Gerhart’s Account of Tort Law and Property Law
This Part sketches Gerhart’s account of tort law and property law.
His account of both bodies of law flows from an optimistic account of
human nature and society. People are social and moral beings who
achieve social cohesion by “factoring the well-being of others into how
they determine their own well-being.”13 People are empathetic. They
are able to “to understand the world as others experience it.”14 People
reciprocate. They make sacrifices for others so others will make sacrifices for them. Over time, “[a]s individuals interact, they develop ways
of accommodating each other’s projects and preferences.”15 Patterns of
accommodation become norms that define “social morality.”16 This
social morality “allows individual human enterprise to flourish in a
community that flourishes.”17
On Gerhart’s account, private law institutionalizes norms of conduct that people have largely worked out for themselves.18 Negligence
law institutionalizes social morality by instructing a person whose
action creates a risk of harm to others to think appropriately about the
well-being of a risk-bearer when deciding how to act. In the case of nonintentional harm, thinking appropriately basically involves a riskcreator putting herself in the risk-bearer’s shoes (while staying in her
own shoes), setting aside individual biases and self-interest, and imagining if she and the risk-bearer talked the matter through, how they
would decide the risk-creator should act.19 Gerhart’s account of negligence law centers on the Hand formula because it can be interpreted to
require just this sort of decision-making by risk-creators.20 According to
Gerhart, negligence law also institutionalizes social morality by requiring a harm-doer to compensate the victim when the harm-doer’s action

13.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 17.

14.

Id. at 40–41.

15.

Id. at 62.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 34, 36.

19.

See id. at 29–30.

20.

Id.
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suggests she failed to think appropriately about the well-being of the
victim.21
Gerhart’s account of property law flows from the observation that
people and societies gradually work out norms of recognition of resource
ownership to handle conflicts over resources and to encourage cooperation. According to Gerhart, property rights exist “because, and to the
extent that, the community, or a large proportion of the community,
recognizes the justness of the claims of possession, labor, or other attributes of ownership.”22 Property rights often are not absolute because
they “are conditioned on constraints embedded in those norms that are
designed to promote the interests of individuals vis-à-vis other
individuals and vis-à-vis the community as a collective entity.”23 As
with tort law, property law institutionalizes these norms of recognition
and their embedded constraints.
Gerhart argues much of property law and tort law institutionalizes
methods of interpersonal decision making, like the Hand negligence
formula, that are good for the community. The law corrects people who
fail to act as these institutionalized norms of interaction require.24 He
explains some instances of liability without fault by social norms that
sometimes require people to repair a burden they impose on another
person as a result of a reasonable decision. 25 For example, when a nuisance is permitted to continue but with compensation, Gerhart explains
the law imposes a duty to pay compensation because, if the defendant
had thought appropriately about the matter, then she would have paid
compensation to the plaintiff without being ordered to do so.26
A great deal of tort law and property law is amenable to Gerhart’s
interpretation. This is not surprising. Reading judicial opinions from
the 19th and early 20th century gives one the strong impression that
judges considered the law in areas like negligence, nuisance, and waste
as not requiring much in the way of justification because the law was
based on custom and common sense. Lord Atkin famously described
negligence law in Donoghue v. Stevenson as defining the duty of care

21.

Id. at 5.

22.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 74.

23.

Id. at 73.

24.

See Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 29–32, 237.

25.

On his account, these are exceptional cases because, in most cases in which
liability is said to be strict, the liability can be explained as fault-based
because the “actor . . . makes unreasonable decisions about the location,
timing, or frequency, or method of his activity . . . .” Id. at 151.

26.

See Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 192–94.
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we owe our neighbors.27 Gerhart shows that much of tort law and property law can be interpreted in just this way as institutionalized norms
of interaction and reasonableness. This is not to belittle Gerhart’s
contribution. He wrote Tort Law and Social Morality because he was
dissatisfied with the current state of theory in torts scholarship and the
“seemingly unbridgeable divide between corrective justice and economic
theory.”28 He bridges this divide by conceiving of tort law not in a topdown way as something imposed by the state on people, but rather in
a bottom-up way as institutionalized social morality.29
Gerhart is able to paint an appealing picture of tort law and
property law because he focuses on areas of the law that are amenable
to being interpreted as institutionalized social morality. The picture is
less appealing if we remember the limited range of human interaction
where private law demands that people show appropriate regard for
others. As Lord Atkin also wrote in Donoghue v. Stevenson, “the
lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply.”30
Gerhart recognizes that there are significant limits on how far one
can take an interpretation of law as institutionalized social morality.
He makes the absence of a duty to rescue a bedrock principle. An actor
has a duty to take into account the well-being of others only if his
action creates a risk to another, or if the actor engages in “an activity
that implies the acceptance of dominion over another’s well-being.”31
He carries this bedrock principle over to property law to justify the
right to exclude:
[A]n individual who has made no choice to take responsibility for
another’s well-being is under no duty to benefit another. The right
to exclude is the right to say “no” to the individual who wants
the unearned benefit of using the owner’s property. An individual
cannot go onto an owner’s property for the same reasons that an
individual cannot go into an owner’s wallet.32

Gerhart’s account of tort law and property law also makes the
absence of liability for unintentional harm to others that could not
27.

[1932] AC 562 (HL) at 580 (Scot.) (“You must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer
seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
question.”).

28.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at xi.

29.

Id. at 239.

30.

[1932] AC at 580.

31.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 106.

32.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 163.
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reasonably have been avoided a bedrock principle.33 He argues at length
in Tort Law and Social Morality that most cases labelled “strict
liability” do not violate this principle.34 He addresses a related issue in
Property Law and Social Morality: what if an actor knowingly harms
another?35 Whether intentionally harming another is permissible is
rarely an issue in personal injury cases because the law rarely permits
people to knowingly inflict bodily harm on other people.36 It is a
significant issue in property law as conflicts in the use of property often
involve knowingly inflicted harm.37 To resolve conflicting uses of
property by neighbors, Gerhart says neighbors should emulate what
people would ideally do in this situation. They should adopt the veil of
ignorance and decide how they would recommend a conflict be resolved
if they did not know which position they were in.38 As the next Part
explains, while the rules that regulate conflicts between neighbors over
the use of property are amenable to Gerhart’s interpretation, most legal
rules that regulate conflicts over property and wealth are not.

II. Parts of Private Law Outside Gerhart’s Account
This Part addresses parts of private law Gerhart does not address.
These include rules that confer powers on people to pursue their own
goals, generally with no requirement that they consider the well-being
of other people. They also include rules in tort law that privilege the
interests of a harm-doer over the interests of a harm-bearer when a
harm is non-physical, and particularly when a harm is purely economic.
The omission of these matters is not a flaw in the books or an oversight.
Gerhart appropriately chooses not to address these parts of the law
because these rules do not require people to act reasonably when an
action affects another person’s well-being.

33.

Id. at 144–46; Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 114–15.

34.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 159–60 (“An actor who makes an
unreasonable activity-level decision is failing to think about the well-being
of others in an appropriate way and should be responsible for harm caused
by that decision . . . . Strict liability is unnecessary, however, because the
negligence regime is fully capable of identifying such decisions and making
the actor responsible for the harm they cause.”).

35.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 147–48.

36.

See Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 226–28 (addressing the
difference between intentional and unintentional torts).

37.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 148 (discussing nuisance law
as an example).

38.

Id. at 149–50, 208–10. Gerhart explains possible solutions, which include
doing nothing, changing a use, and paying compensation either for the
cost to change a use or for the burden imposed by a use. Id. at 210–11.
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A. Power-Conferring Rules and Weak Equitable Safeguards

Much of property law consists of power-conferring rules.39 These
rules establish the basic legal characteristics of different types of
property interests and approved ways to create, transfer, and eliminate
an interest. For example, the rules on security interests establish the
basic legal characteristics of a security interest and establish how one
creates, transfers, and eliminates a security interest.40 Gerhart says little
about property law’s power-conferring rules in Property Law and Social
Morality. His interest is how property law regulates the management of
resources and not the rules in property law that define the legal
characteristics of different forms of property interests and how one
creates, transfers, and eliminates such an interest.41 For example,
Gerhart discusses how temporal division of property ownership creates
the need for rules on waste to protect future owners,42 but he does not
discuss the rules that make temporal divisions of property possible.
The terms of a power-conferring rule generally instruct people on
how to exercise a power and the legal consequences of its exercise.43 A
power-conferring rule often does not define the permissible reasons for

39.

H.L.A. Hart is credited with coining the term “power-conferring rule” to
describe a type of legal rule that is not a command and does not impose
a duty. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27–28 (1961). See also
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound
Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008), for a thoughtful discussion of the
problems of distinguishing rules that confer powers and rules that impose
duties.
[P]ower-creating laws have two characteristic features. First, the
law must be designed in a way that underwrites an expectation of
its purposive use—an expectation that persons will satisfy the law
for the sake of the legal consequences. Second, that expectation
must be the law’s reason for attaching those legal consequences to
acts of that type.
Id. at 1741–42. Klass continues that “[t]he clearest indication that a law
is concerned with the purpose with which it is satisfied” is that a law’s
validity conditions “sort for legal purpose.” Id. at 1743. He identifies four
broad “types of such validity conditions: legal formalities; required
nonconventional legal speech acts; legal-intent tests; and nonlinguistic
proxies for legal purpose.” Id.

40.

See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2020).

41.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 5, 13. An exception is
Gerhart’s account of legal rules that prohibit certain forms of division of
property, such as restrictions on alienability and future interests with
unidentifiable owners. See id. at 238, 244–46 (explaining that exceptions
are necessary to enable the market to function as a constraint on
mismanagement of property).

42.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 234–36.

43.

H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 Yale L.J. 799, 821–22 (1972).
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exercising a power.44 Nor does a power-conferring rule generally require
a person to consider other people’s well-being in deciding whether and
how to exercise a power. The rules on wills illustrate. They instruct
people on how to make a will and the legal consequences of making a
will.45 They do not instruct people on the permissible reasons for making
a will or require people to consider other people’s well-being in making
a will.
When a dispute arises involving the application of a powerconferring rule, courts generally follow the rule’s terms strictly and do
not consider the relative equities of the parties to the dispute.46 This
would undercut the power conferred by the rule. This characteristic of
power-conferring rules was clearer when law and equity were separate
systems because equitable considerations came into play under a
separate body of law, the law of equity, which would sometimes override
the normal operation of a rule to prevent someone from taking unfair
advantage of non-compliance with a power-conferring rule.47 Deciding
whether and how to make an exception to a rule requires a court to
balance the value of doing justice in an individual case against the cost
of destabilizing a rule.48 If a court creates an exception to a rule, then
the court’s opinion is likely to condemn the defendant’s conduct and
justify the exception in highly moralistic terms. But the court will also
make it clear that the exception is narrow, and that generally the rule
being overridden is strictly enforced.

44.

See id. (stating that power-conferring rules tell people how to use them
but do not impose a duty on when to use them). The rules on servitudes
are an exception that illustrates the general rule. Under the old “touch
and concern” requirement, a servitude had to enhance the value of the
dominant estate. Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some
Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1403,
1409 (1982).

45.

See Klass, supra note 39, at 1735 (emphasizing legal duties rather than
other-regarding considerations).

46.

Id. at 1763–64.

47.

See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 Yale L.J. 1050, 1076–1081
(2021) (arguing one function of equity is to redress opportunism); Dennis
Klimchuk, Aristotle at the Foundations of the Law of Equity (arguing a
current of “equity seeks to prevent the defendant from being a stickler in
a bad way” for his legal rights), in Philosophical Foundations of the
Law of Equity 32, 38–40 (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2020); cf. J.E. Penner, Equity, Justice, and Conscience:
Suitors Behaving Badly? (developing account of equity as enforcement of
“imperfect duties of virtue” to “prevent people from taking advantage of
others” in ways that do not involve violating fundamental norms), in
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Equity, supra, at 52, 70.

48.

See Mark P. Gergen, The System of Equitable Wrongs (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 7) (on file with author).
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Tkachik v. Mandeville49 is a 21st-century example of equity operating in just this way. Frank Mandeville “abandoned his wife [Janet] for
the final 18 months of her life while she was battling [breast] cancer.”50
Several weeks before her death, Janet revised her will to disinherit
Frank.51 She also tried to dissolve a tenancy by the entirety in their
home and another property they co-owned so Frank would not acquire
her interest through a right of survivorship on her death.52 But she did
this the wrong way, transferring her interest by a quitclaim deed rather
than by filing for divorce or separate maintenance.53 In other words,
Janet failed to comply with the power-conferring rule that governs the
dissolution of tenancy in the entirety. The equitable issue in the case
was whether Janet’s estate could recover Frank’s half of the expenses
she paid to maintain the property on a claim for contribution.54 A divided court allowed the claim, proclaiming “equity, and the principles of
natural justice embodied therein, call on defendant Frank Mandeville
to contribute his share of the property maintenance costs incurred by
this wife.”55 The court also took pains to explain this was a narrow
exception to the normal rules governing dissolution of a tenancy in the
entirety.56
Gerhart does not discuss equitable doctrines, like duress, undue
influence, and constructive fraud, that allow courts to create exceptions
to rules in property law and contract law to redress unfair-advantagetaking of a person’s failure to comply with a power-conferring rule. This
is not an oversight or a flaw in the books. These doctrines relate to
social morality in a different way than negligence law, nuisance law,
and the other rules that Gerhart discusses. On Gerhart’s account, social
morality bears a direct relationship to the rules in negligence law. Rules
of negligence law basically instruct people to act reasonably and
empower courts to redress unreasonable conduct.
The equitable doctrines bear a less direct relationship to social
morality. They ask a court to balance the value of doing justice in an
individual case (which may well be a matter of social morality) and the
cost of destabilizing a rule when deciding whether to create an exception
to a rule. This leaves a gap between what a rule of reasonableness would
require and what equity will correct. For example, in Tkachik v.
Mandeville, if Frank had thought appropriately about the well-being of
49.

790 N.W.2d 260 (Mich. 2010).

50.

Id. at 262.

51.

Id. at 263.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 263, 269.

54.

Id. at 264.

55.

Id. at 267.

56.

Id. at 269.
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Janet (or her heirs), then I believe he would have conveyed her halfinterest in the properties to the estate. All equity required of him was
to pay his half of the expenses to maintain the property.57 The dissenting justices would not have required even this much.58
B. Rules that Privilege Harm-Doers over Harm-Bearers

A policy of strictly enforcing power-conferring rules subject to
limited equitable safeguards can be thought of as privileging the interest
of the party who benefits from enforcement of a rule over the interest
of the party who is harmed by enforcement of a rule. This Part
addresses rules in tort law that similarly privilege a harm-doer’s interest
in freedom of action over a harm-bearer’s interest in freedom of harm
when the harm is non-physical. Examples include commercial torts like
deceit and interference with contract and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Gerhart says little about these rules in Tort Law and Social
Morality. He touches on commercial torts briefly in Property Law and
Social Morality. In discussing what interests are treated as property,
Gerhart applauds “the 1410 Schoolmaster Case” for “establishing the
principle, now foundational, that no producer has a property right in
his prospective profits,” and that “harm inflicted through fair competition was not actionable.”59 Later, in discussing the appropriate sphere
of the common law, Gerhart applauds Justice Brandeis’s dissenting
opinion in International News Service v. Associated Press,60 which
argued courts did not have the capacity to decide whether selling news
collected by a competitor is unfair competition.61 This is to make the
general point that “[t]he common law is at its best when disputes
involve clear harm to identified individuals from identified sources
attributable to other individuals, and where the range of interests and
information that must be taken into account is narrow and wellrepresented by the parties to the dispute.”62
Gerhart correctly omits commercial torts like deceit and interference with contract from his account of tort law, for these rules permit
a great deal of unreasonable conduct to go uncorrected. The same is
true for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To put
57.

Id. at 276.

58.

Id. at 277 (Weaver, J., dissenting); id. at 295 (Young, J., dissenting).

59.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 106 (citing Hamlyn v. More
(The Schoolmasters’ Case), Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410)
(Eng.), translated in John Baker, Baker and Milsom Sources of
English Legal History 671–73 (2d ed. 2010)).

60.

248 U.S. 215 (1918).

61.

Gerhart, Property Law, supra note 2, at 294–95, 295 n.5 (citing Int’l
News Serv., 248 U.S. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

62.

Id. at 294.
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these torts in perspective, the diagram below maps tort law on two
dimensions. I also include the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, which Gerhart addresses.63 I borrow the basic schema from
Mark Geistfeld.64
 Deceit
 Interference with contract
and business relations
 Intentional infliction of emotional
distress

Liberty

Subjective Culpability

Negligence

Security
 Trespass
 Battery
 Strict liability

No Culpability

The horizontal dimension captures the balance a rule strikes
between a harm-doer’s interest in liberty of action and a harm-bearer’s
interest in security from harm. At one end of this dimension are rules
of immunity or privilege that prioritize a harm-doer’s interest in liberty
of action, such as the privilege for competition and the privilege to say
harmful things about a public figure. At the other end are strict liability
rules that prioritize the harm-bearer’s interest in security from harm.
The negligence rule is at the center for it balances the parties’
conflicting interests by making an actor liable for harm she causes when
her action creates an unreasonable risk of harm while privileging an
actor’s conduct when her conduct does not create an unreasonable risk
of harm. The negligence rule makes victims bear the cost of accidents
that are not worth avoiding, which promotes liberty of action.
The vertical dimension captures how a tort rule defines a culpable
state of mind. At one end of this dimension are intentional torts that
require subjective culpability. At the other end are strict liability rules
that require no culpability. “Negligence once again is at the conceptual

63.

Gerhart, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 233. Gerhart argues “[w]hen the
plaintiff alleges the intentional infliction of emotional harm, the court
must compare the plaintiff’s harm with the social value of the defendant’s
conduct, and this is fundamentally a reasonable determination.” Id. This
explanation of the tort cannot account for the requirement that the conduct
be “extreme and outrageous” and the harm “severe.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 45 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). These requirements
permit a great deal of unreasonable conduct to go unchecked.

64.

Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law: The Essentials 15–16 (2008).
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center,” Geistfeld observes, because it is a rule of “objective culpability.”65 Legal rules that require people to act reasonably when an action
affects other people’s well-being again are at the center of the diagram.
The torts in the upper left-hand corner of the diagram privilege a
harm-doer’s interest in liberty of action over a harm-bearer’s interest in
security from harm and so let a great deal of unreasonable conduct go
uncorrected. These rules immunize conduct that can be quite offensive
morally. For example, liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires the defendant’s conduct to be “extreme and outrageous” and the plaintiff’s emotional distress to be “severe.”66 Liability
for deceit requires not just an intentional misrepresentation and foreseeable reliance;67 liability also requires the plaintiff’s reliance to be justifiable, which many American courts treat as a requirement of reasonable
reliance.68 A requirement of reasonable reliance in the law of deceit
creates a legal license to take advantage of another person’s gullibility.
The debate about the limits of the tort of interference with business
relations is largely about what role tort law should play in redressing
conduct in the commercial arena that is clearly inappropriate when the
conduct in question does not violate other rules of tort law. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted an open-ended tort that could
reach any conduct a court deemed improper.69 This made possible the
successful interference claim in Nesler v. Fisher & Co.,70 where an owner
of an office building pursued a long campaign of harassment against a
potential competitor, which included filing or funding meritless lawsuits, while being careful not to cross the line and commit abuse of
process and defamation.71 Most state courts refused to adopt the openended tort and so the third Restatement relented, allowing a claim for

65.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

66.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).

67.

Id. at § 525; see also Glassford v. Dufresne & Assocs., P.C., 124 A.3d 822,
828 (Vt. 2015) (“[L]iability for fraudulent misrepresentation under
Restatement § 531, which attaches when a plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation is reasonably foreseeable.”).

68.

Mark P. Gergen, A Wrong Turn in the Law of Deceit, 106 Geo. L.J.
555, 564 & n.31 (2018) (citing several cases in support).

69.

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766B, 767 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
Section 766B allows claims for intentional and improper interference with
business relations. Section 767 has a multifactor test to determine whether
interference is improper. Id. The factors balanced include the interests of
the two parties and “the social interests in protecting the freedom of action
of the actor.” Id. at § 767.

70.

452 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1990).

71.

Id. at 193.
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interference with business relations only when the defendant’s conduct
is independently wrongful.72
This is not the place to try to explain what reasons justify these
rules. It is clear that whatever these reasons may be, these rules do not
instruct people on how to think appropriately about the well-being of
other people. A person who thought appropriately about another
person’s well-being would not choose to gratuitously say something he
knew to be painful so long as the pain was not “severe.” And a person
who thought appropriately about another person’s well-being would not
choose to deceive someone so long as the deception would not trick a
reasonable person.
Gerhart’s account of private law works best for rules at the center
of the diagram where the interest of the plaintiff in liberty of action
and the interest of the defendant in security from harm are treated by
the law as being in equipoise. Gerhart is able to account for rules in the
lower right-hand corner on trespass by reasoning that a defendant who
trespassed innocently or out of necessity, and who harmed the plaintiff’s
property, would pay for the harm, if the defendant reasoned appropriately about her obligation to the plaintiff.73 A similar explanation for
the no-liability rules in the upper left-hand corner of the diagram is
implausible.74

III. Gerhart’s Account of Contract Law
This Part takes up Contract Law and Social Morality. It begins
with Gerhart’s account of rules that apply once a contract has been
formed, for this part of contract law is most amenable to Gerhart’s
interpretation. This Part then turns to two parts of contract law that
are less amenable to Gerhart’s interpretation. They are the rules on
conditions and the rules on contract formation.

72.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm
§ 18(b) (Am. L. Inst. 2020) (requiring the defendant to have “committed
an independent and intentional legal wrong”).

73.

See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.

74.

The argument would be that if the harm-bearer thought appropriately
about the well-being of the harm-doer, then the harm-bearer would decide
not to demand compensation for this harm. This argument may be
plausible in cases involving inadvertent harm, such as negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Because of the cost involved in demanding and
obtaining compensation, people who thought appropriately about the
matter might decide it is best for everyone that unintentional harm go
uncompensated in the absence of physical harm even when the harmdoer’s conduct is unreasonable. This argument is not plausible in cases
involving intentional harm. A gullible victim of a fraud who is denied
recovery because his reliance is unreasonable would not be expected to
say “well-played” to the fraudster, if the victim thought appropriately
about the matter.
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According to Gerhart, once a contract has been formed, a party has
a duty to think appropriately about the well-being of the other party
when making decisions related to the contract.75 This method of
appropriate other-regarding reasoning is similar to the method of
reasoning described in Tort Law and Social Morality and Property Law
and Social Morality, but with an important difference. The similarity
is that a party should be guided by the Golden Rule and assume the
veil of ignorance in making decisions about whether and how to perform
a contract. 76 In more colloquial terms, a party should put herself in the
other party’s shoes (while staying in her own shoes), set aside personal
biases and self-interest, imagine the two parties talked the matter
through, and ask what decision they would agree she should make in
light of their competing interests. The important difference is that the
parties’ agreement defines the baseline for appropriate other-regarding
reasoning.77 Like negligence law, contract law requires people to act
reasonably. The difference is that the parties’ agreement defines the
parameters of the requirement of reasonableness in contract law.
This account places a great deal of weight on the definition of the
parties’ agreement. Gerhart’s treatment of boilerplate terms in consumer form contracts illustrates. According to Gerhart, these terms are
not bargained for and so they are not part of the agreement.78 The
baseline agreed exchange is the terms on which the parties actually
agreed, which Karl Llewellyn called the “dickered terms.”79 Gerhart
applauds the doctrine of reasonable expectations because the doctrine
requires a form contract maker to engage in appropriate other-regarding
reasoning with respect to boilerplate terms.80 Under this doctrine, a
boilerplate term in a form contract is not enforceable when the form
maker “has reason to believe that the party manifesting . . . assent” to
the form “would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term.”81 For example, the doctrine instructs a court not to
75.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 105–06.

76.

Id. at 80–81.

77.

Id. at 123 (“[T]he goal of determining performance obligations is to
preserve the ex ante balance of burdens and benefits that each party
bargained for in the exchange, the ex ante exchange equilibrium.”).

78.

Id. at 163–65.

79.

Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding
Appeals 370 (1960).

80.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 163–66.

81.

Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 211(3) (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
Gerhart credits the draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts with
adopting this rule. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 160–61.
The reporters have consistently resisted embracing the reasonableexpectations doctrine, preferring to rely on the unconscionability doctrine,
which sets a higher bar for not enforcing a term. See Restatement of
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enforce a boilerplate term that “eviscerates the non-standard terms
explicitly agreed to, or . . . eliminates the dominant purpose of the
transaction.”82
Gerhart’s argument for the doctrine of reasonable expectations rises
or falls with the premise that the baseline agreement to which the
requirement of reasonableness attaches is the parties’ actual agreement.
This premise is debatable as a legal matter because classical contract
law defines the baseline agreement as the terms in a writing that the
parties adopt as an expression of their agreement. I will return to this
point.83
The doctrine of material breach is a less problematic example of a
rule in contract law that requires parties to act reasonably within the
framework of the agreed exchange.84 The doctrine defines when a party
may suspend performance in response to the other party’s nonperformance.85 Formally, this is determined by applying a multi-factor
standard that requires a court to balance the risk that the aggrieved
party will suffer an uncompensated loss if she does not suspend
performance, the loss to the defaulter if performance is suspended, and
whether the defaulter acted in bad faith.86 Contracts often break down
because the parties escalate what may start as a relatively minor
dispute. The doctrine instructs a court to cast the loss on the first party
who escalated a dispute in a way that indicates she did not engage in
appropriate other-regarding reasoning.87 The doctrine implicitly instructs parties to engage in appropriately other-regarding reasoning in
Consumer Conts. § 5 cmt. 4 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft 2019)
(stating the standard of substantive unconscionability is expressed in
terms like “‘shock the conscience,’ ‘oppressive,’ ‘unreasonably harsh,’ or
‘fundamentally unfair’ . . . to capture a limiting criterion, that the
doctrine is to be used only when the one-sidedness of a term in the
contract is extreme.”). The tentative draft only embraces the part of the
reasonable-expectation doctrines that prevents a boilerplate term from
overriding an express representation. See id. at § 7. Gerhart knew he was
giving the reporters credit that they did not deserve. When I asked him
whether his motives were political, he smiled.
82.

Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 211 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1981).

83.

See infra Part IV.

84.

See infra text and accompanying notes 190–221. I talked with Gerhart
about using this doctrine and other constructive conditions to illustrate
his method at the KCON meeting in Sacramento in early 2020. Had he
lived, I expect he would have included the point made here in the book.

85.

See Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 241 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).

86.

Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U.
L. Rev. 1397, 1411 (2009).

87.

K & G Construction Co. v. Harris illustrates. 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md.
1960). There was a dispute over whether a subcontractor was responsible
for damage caused by its bulldozer, which turned on whether the operator
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deciding whether to suspend performance by balancing their need to
suspend performance to avoid losing the benefit of their bargain against
the burden imposed on the other party if they suspend performance.
The doctrine of material breach illustrates what it means to make
the agreed exchange the baseline for the requirement of reasonableness.
An aggrieved party may suspend performance to avoid suffering an
uncompensated loss, even though suspending performance inflicts a
larger loss on the other party. Since the baseline is the agreed exchange,
the aggrieved party is entitled to suspend performance to avoid
suffering a material uncompensated loss, though this inflicts a larger
loss on the defaulter, because she is entitled to the benefit of her
bargain.88 She is allowed to treat her interest in receiving the benefit of
the bargain as paramount over the other party’s interest in avoiding
loss. However, a buyer may not seize on a curable defect in goods to
get out a contract when the market price of the goods has dropped.89
This would deny the seller the benefit of her bargain, which is the right
to be paid an above-market price for the goods. The doctrine also allows
the aggrieved party to consider whether the defaulter acted in an
appropriately other-regarding way (i.e., in good faith) in defaulting.
Other contract doctrines that regulate responses to nonperformance
have a broadly similar structure to the doctrine of material breach and
serve a broadly similar function. These include the duty to mitigate,90
the substantial performance doctrine,91 the rule governing the choice
between remedial cost and loss in market value as a measure of damages

was negligent. Id. at 454, 456. The general contractor withheld a payment
to cover the claim. Id. The subcontractor responded by stopping work.
The court correctly cast the loss on the subcontractor because there was
no evidence that the subcontractor needed the withheld payment to
continue work. Id. The subcontractor responded inappropriately by
stopping work. Id.
88.

Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. illustrates. 474 P.2d 689,
692–94 (Cal. 1970). The only way Parker could avoid suffering an
uncompensated loss from losing the role in Bloomer Girl was to refuse the
role in Big Country, Big Man and sue for the contract price. Id. Thus, her
decision was reasonable though it imposed a significant loss on the studio
and may have given Parker a windfall. Id.

89.

See, e.g., T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932, 938 & n.8
(N.Y. 1982).

90.

Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 350 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).

91.

Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921), is a
canonical case.
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for incomplete or defective performance,92 the aggrieved party’s restitution claim,93 and the defaulter’s restitution claim.94 All of these
doctrines require the party making a choice addressed by a rule (and
require a court tasked with reviewing a choice made) to balance the
extent to which the contemplated (or chosen) response to nonperformance is necessary for the aggrieved party to obtain the benefit of her
bargain, the burden the response imposes on the defaulter, and whether
the defaulter acted in bad faith. The agreed exchange defines the
baseline under all of these doctrines. The primary goal is to ensure the
aggrieved party obtains the benefit of her bargain. Once this goal is
achieved, the rules minimize the burden on the defaulter so long as the
defaulter acted in good faith.
It is not surprising that rules like the doctrine of material breach
that regulate response to nonperformance are amenable to being
interpreted as applications of a general requirement of reasonableness
within the parameters of the agreed exchange. A breakdown of a
contract is like an accident in tort law or a conflict between neighbors
regarding use of property. These conflicts involve problems of coordination that often are not amenable to being solved in advance—either by
parties writing terms or by courts establishing rules to cover the
problem. Gerhart argues people can best solve these sorts of problems
if they put themselves in each other’s shoes, set aside their personal
biases and self-interest, and identify a solution that works best for all
involved. And he argues the law should encourage people to think in
this way in these situations. What is different about the contractual
setting is that the agreed exchange defines the parameters for an appropriate solution.
Gerhart advocates for a robust duty of good faith and fair dealing
in the form of a general rule that would require parties to engage in
appropriate other-regarding reasoning in making decisions in performing or enforcing a contract when the contract gives a party discretion
in making a decision.95 Again, the agreed exchange sets the baseline.
Gerhart’s incisive analysis of Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.96
illustrates how this works. The case involved an output contract for the
sale of breadcrumbs.97 The seller was a bakery that hoped to make a

92.

Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 348 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla.
1963), is a canonical case.

93.

Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 38
(Am. L. Inst. 2011).

94.

Id. at § 36.

95.

Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 136–43.

96.

335 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1975).

97.

Id. at 321.
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profit by installing a new oven to turn bread scraps into breadcrumbs.98
This turned out to be a losing venture. After the buyer refused to pay
a 1¢ per pound increase, the seller scrapped the oven and sold its scrap
bread to a pig farmer.99 Victor Goldberg has argued this was not a
breach of the requirement of good faith in UCC § 2-306(1) because the
seller was losing money and the buyer did not rely on the contract for
it had other sources for breadcrumbs.100 Gerhart responds this may give
too little weight to the parties’ bargain. The contract had a six-month
termination clause.101 Gerhart argues the case should turn on whether
this clause was meant to protect the seller (as well as the buyer), for if
the clause did not protect the seller, then this would indicate the seller
was not meant to be protected against loss by an implied right under
the output term to stop production without notice.102 He predicts that
who the termination clause was meant to protect could probably be
easily determined by looking at the history of the negotiation of the
contract.103
Open performance terms, like the term in Feld, are a special case
because people invite ex post regulation of performance decisions by a
court when they use an open performance term like an outputs or
requirements quantity term, a best-efforts term, or a condition of
satisfaction. The robust duty of good faith Gerhart proposes would go
further than most U.S. courts have been willing to go to prevent people
from exploiting unexpected gaps or loopholes in a contract. Some courts
reject the doctrine entirely104 or almost entirely.105 When a breach of the
duty is found, there generally is a compelling specific ground, such as

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100. Victor Goldberg, Framing Contract Law: An Economic
Perspective 117–19 (2006); U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (Am. L. Inst. & Unif.
L. Comm’n 2020).
101. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 139; Feld, 335 N.E.2d at
321.
102. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 139–41.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
105. See, e.g., Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, 817
(Utah 2011) (restricting doctrine to cases “where it is clear from the
parties’ ‘course of dealings’ or a settled custom or usage of the trade that
the parties undoubtedly would have agreed to the covenant . . . .”).

373

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 2·2021
Gerhart and Private Law’s Melody of Reasonableness

dishonesty,106 a clear abuse of a right,107 a violation of a term implied
by strong evidence of custom or usage,108 or grossly unreasonable
conduct when a party exploits a gap or loophole to capture a gain for
himself by inflicting a much larger loss on the other party.109 For
example, Gerhart’s robust version of the duty of good faith might well
have allowed the claim in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital,110 where an at-will employee claimed that her termination for
refusing to participate in a skit that required her to moon the audience
was a breach of the duty of good faith.111 The court denied the claim.112
The rules on conditions are not amenable to Gerhart’s interpretation. These rules are power-conferring. They give people the power
not to be under an obligation by making an obligation the subject of a
condition. When a condition is strictly enforced, substantial performance is not enough.113 This allows an obligor to invoke a condition
to avoid an obligation without regard to whether non-fulfillment of the
condition actually impairs the interests the condition was meant to
serve. This is not consistent with the requirement of reasonableness.
A large body of rules temper enforcement of conditions. These rules
require special facts like waiver by the obligor;114 affirmative misconduct
106. For example, Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey is
explained on this ground once it is recognized that taking advantage of
the other party’s mistake regarding the terms of a writing is a form of
dishonesty. 941 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1991).
107. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Reg. Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257–58
(Mass. 1977) (showing that an at-will employee was terminated to deprive
him of a large bonus on sales).
108. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772,
805–06 (9th Cir. 1981) (implying term that asphalt supplier would protect
paving company from a price increase based on strong evidence of course
of performance and trade practice).
109. See, e.g., Seggebruch v. Stosor, 33 N.E.2d 159, 160–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941)
(explaining that a lessee avoided obligation to pay based on gas sales on
premises by moving pumps to adjoining property).
110. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
111. Id. at 1029.
112. Id. at 1038–41. The court allowed the claim to proceed on the ground that
the termination violated public policy. Id. at 1044.
113. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., is a leading case
and an example of the point in the next sentence above. 660 N.E.2d 415,
419 (N.Y. 1995). The defendant was allowed to renege on a commercial
sublease when the plaintiff failed to provide the landlord’s written consent
to work by a specified date though the plaintiff had obtained the landlord’s verbal consent by that date and quickly obtained the landlord’s
written consent. Id. at 417, 421.
114. See Clark v. West, in which a publisher agreed to pay an author an
additional $4 per page for a treatise if the author abstained from
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by the obligor that is a basis for estoppel or a finding of interference;115
or impracticability plus the absence of material harm from nonfulfillment of the condition.116 And U.S. courts have given limited effect
to a rule that allows a court to excuse nonfulfillment of a condition to
avoid disproportionate forfeiture.117 This pattern is similar to the
pattern observed earlier with respect to power-conferring rules in
property and equitable rules that sometimes allow a court to override
a rule to avoid an unfair result. The rules that temper enforcement of
conditions are weak safeguards that permit a great deal of unreasonable
conduct to go unchecked.
Some parts of the law of contract formation also are not amenable
to Gerhart’s interpretation. Gerhart proposes that the consideration
requirement and bargain test be replaced by a general rule that is
similar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.118 Under his proposed
general rule, an apparent promise would be irrevocable if the promise
materially “change[d] the promisee’s decision space.”119 Gerhart does
not address a bevy of formal requirements for contract that basically
resolve a disagreement about the existence or the terms of a contract
in favor of the party denying a contractual obligation. They include the
statute of frauds, the definiteness requirement,120 the mutuality requirement,121 the presumption that an offer is revocable,122 the requirement
that an acceptance be unequivocal,123 and the mirror image rule.124
“intoxicating liquor.” 86 N.E. 1, 2 (N.Y. 1908). The author’s claim for the
additional $4 was allowed to proceed, though the author violated the
condition, but only on a theory of express waiver. Id. at 5.
115. Johnson v. Coss, 667 N.W.2d 701, 706–08 (S.D. 2003) (applying
prevention doctrine).
116. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 271 (Am. L. Inst. 1981)
(conditioning excuse on grounds of impracticability on occurrence of the
condition not being “a material part of the agreed exchange”).
117. Id. at § 227. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219,
224 (Conn. 1988) (adopting the rule while placing the burden on the
obligee to establish that the obligor was not materially prejudiced by
nonfulfillment of the condition); Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim,
Appel, & Dixon Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995) (adopting the rule
while restricting it to cases in which obligee would suffer a reliance loss).
118. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 116–19.
119. Id. at 116.
120. See, e.g., Acad. Chi. Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 983 (Ill.
1991).
121. See, e.g., Off. Pavilion S. Fla., Inc. v. ASAL Prods., Inc., 849 So.2d 367,
370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
122. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 36(c) (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
123. See, e.g., id. at § 57; Ardente v. Horan, 366 A.2d 162, 165 (R.I. 1976).
124. See Restatement (Second) of Conts. §§ 58–59 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
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Modern contract law (e.g., the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and Article Two of the U.C.C.) weakens or eliminates many of these
formal requirements for a contract, moving the rules on contract
formation closer to Gerhart’s account. For example, if courts adopted
the broad claim in Restatement (Second) Contracts § 139 to overcome
a statute of frauds defense, then this part of contract law would be
amenable to Gerhart’s interpretation. Under § 139, a court may give a
remedy for breach of an oral promise based on an all-things-considered
judgment that this is a reasonable way to resolve the parties’ disagreement about the existence of a contract.125 Only a light thumb is placed
on the scale in favor of the defendant.126 But most American courts
have not adopted § 139 and instead require exceptional facts to override
the statute of frauds.127 As a consequence, contract law allows a party
to renege on an apparent oral promise even when this decision would
clearly be unreasonable, if the party engaged in appropriate otherregarding reasoning.
Formal requirements for a contract, like the statute of frauds and
the definiteness requirement, are similar to the rules in tort law that
privilege a harm-doer’s interest in liberty of action over a harm-bearer’s
interest in security from harm. When there is a disagreement about the
existence of a contract, formal requirements for a contract privilege the
interests of the party denying a contractual obligation over the interests
of the party claiming a contractual obligation. Part V will return to
this point. It will argue Gerhart does not adequately address the tension
created by defining contract as a domain of reasonableness that is
within a larger domain in which people are independent and owe limited
duties to others.

IV. Contract Interpretation
This Part considers Gerhart’s proposal for how courts should
handle problems of contract interpretation. It argues the proposal is an
important contribution to the literature on contract interpretation. I
will refer to the proposal as the Gerhart–Kostritsky (“G–K”) proposal

125. Id. at § 139(1).
126. Section 139 slightly favors the defendant by making enforcement
discretionary (“as justice requires”) and by resolving evidentiary doubt
about the existence or terms of the agreement in favor of the defendant.
See id. at § 139 (stating as relevant “the extent to which the action or
forbearance corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise,
or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing
evidence”).
127. See, e.g., Classic Cheesecake Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 546 F.3d
839, 841–43 (7th Cir. 2008).
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because it is most fully developed in a co-authored paper.128 After a
brief explanation of the G–K proposal, this Part will situate the
proposal within the debate on contract interpretation and then explain
why the proposal may well be the best way to handle problems of
contract interpretation.
G–K begin with the non-controversial point that, when there is a
dispute over the meaning of a term in a contract, the court’s task is to
pick between the two meanings advanced by the parties.129 G–K propose
the court should choose the meaning that is more reasonable in light of
the parties’ bargain.130 The court would do this by asking both parties
to explain the factual assumptions under which their interpretation
would maximize the expected joint surplus under the contract.131 The
court would then choose the interpretation that has the more plausible
factual assumptions.132 The court could consider evidence offered to
establish the validity of an implausible factual assumption, but only if
the court determined there was a sufficient probability that the
evidence could make the factual assumption plausible.133
The G–K method of resolving problems of interpretation suggests
some simple rules of thumb. Generally, a court should select the interpretation that maximizes the joint expected return on a contract, or
that allocates risk to the party in a superior position to bear the risk,
when there is a significant allocative difference in the competing
interpretations.134 A court should reject an interpretation that depends
on an unusual source of value to one party when this value was not
communicated to the other party.135 A court should choose an interpretation that is consistent with trade practice when it is implausible that
the parties had some other meaning in mind.136 And a court should
128. See Peter M. Gerhart & Juliet P. Kostritsky, Efficient Contextualism, 76
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 509, 509–10 (2015).
129. Id. at 514–15.
130. Id. at 536.
131. Id. at 546–47.
132. Id. at 547.
133. See id.
134. This rule of thumb is suggested by G–K’s analysis of Midwest Television,
Inc. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 573 (Ct. App.
1988), and Westgate Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 971
N.E.2d 967 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128,
at 551–53, 556-59.
135. This rule of thumb is suggested by G–K’s analysis of Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). See Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra
note 128, at 545–48.
136. This rule of thumb is suggested by G–K’s analysis of Hurst v. W.J. Lake
& Co., 16 P.2d 627 (Or. 1932). See Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128,
at 548–51.
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reject an interpretation that makes one party an insurer against a risk
of loss the other party naturally faces in its business in the absence of
evidence the party was compensated to bear this risk.137
I draw these rules of thumb from G–K’s analysis of several cases.
They do not draw any rules of thumb. I expect they chose not to do so
because this might defeat their main objective, which is to encourage
courts to abjure rule-bound reasoning in resolving issues of interpretation.138 They encourage courts to think about “how the parties set
up the exchange to get the most from the exchange” given “each party’s
goals, motivations and likely decision making processes.”139 This way of
thinking about a transaction will be familiar to anyone who has engineered, litigated, or taught a complicated transaction. The goal of a
transaction engineer is to help the parties (or at least her clients) get
the most from a transaction in light of the parties’ goals and
motivations and their decision-making processes. A litigator must
reverse-engineer a complex transaction in just this way to understand
how it was intended to work and why it broke down. A teacher must
reverse-engineer a complex transaction to explain the choices the parties
and their lawyers made in designing the transaction. The G–K proposal
puts the onus on the parties to educate the court about a transaction
by requiring the parties to explain the factual assumptions on which
their interpretation of the writing is more reasonable. Often only one
story will be plausible. The over-arching message is that problems of
interpretation are best solved by asking which meaning makes sense in
light of the transaction.
G–K join recent papers on contract interpretation by Gregory
Klass140 and Shafar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein141 in trying to shift the
focus in the debate about interpretation from the question of what
evidence a court ought to consider in interpreting a writing to the
question of what type of meaning a court ought to ascribe to terms in
a writing.142 G–K come down squarely in favor of what Klass refers to

137. This rule of thumb is suggested by G–K’s analysis of Columbia Nitrogen
Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). See Gerhart &
Kostritsky, supra note 128, at 559–65.
138. See id. at 518–20 (“[W]e suggest that interpretation cannot be a rulebased enterprise . . . .”).
139. Id. at 540.
140. Gregory Klass, Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the InterpretationConstruction Distinction Right, 18 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 13 (2020).
141. Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on the
Interpretation of Contracts, 54 Am. Bus. L.J. 519 (2017).
142. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 144; see infra notes 143–46
and accompanying text.
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as the “pragmatic” or “purposive” meaning. Klass contrasts this meaning with the “semantic” meaning of terms in a writing.143 Lifshiftz &
Finkelstein add a second dimension—whether a court ascribes the
authorial meaning or the textual meaning to the relevant term—that
clarifies how the G–K proposal differs from both modern contract law
(i.e., the second Restatement) and classical contract law (i.e., the first
Restatement).144 Modern contract law ascribes the authorial meaning145
while classical contract law ascribes the objective meaning.146
One difference between the G–K approach and modern contract
law is they reject authorial meaning as the touchstone for contract
interpretation.147 G–K reject authorial meaning for practical reasons.
They believe an inquiry into the meaning the parties ascribed to terms
in a writing at the time the contract was made will rarely resolve a
problem of contract interpretation.148 According to G–K, usually an
inquiry into ex ante intent will be unhelpful because the parties will not
have thought about the circumstances that gave rise to the dispute
when the contract was made.149 And, in the unusual case where the
parties have thought about the matter, they will claim different ex ante
143. Klass, supra note 140, at 23, 32. Lifshitz & Finkelstein refer to these different
types of meaning as “linguistic” and “purposive.” Lifshitz & Finkelstein,
supra note 141, at 523.
144. Lifshitz & Finkelstein, supra note 141, at 523.
145. Section 201 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts begins from the
premise that the interpretation of an agreement turns on the meaning the
parties attached to the relevant term(s) when the agreement was made.
The objective rule is deployed to determine which meaning prevails when
the parties attach different meanings to a relevant term when the contract
was made. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 201 (Am. L. Inst.
1981). On the G–K view, resolving most interpretive disputes is akin to
supplying an omitted term because the court must choose between two
meanings that could be ascribed to the relevant term(s) when an inquiry
into the parties’ ex ante intent cannot resolve the dispute. Reasonableness
is the guiding principle when a court must supply an omitted term to give
effect to a promise or agreement, id. § 204, just as reasonableness is the
guiding principle of contract interpretation under the G–K proposal. See
supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
146. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 230 (Am. L. Inst. 1932) (a
court takes the perspective of “a reasonably intelligent person acquainted
with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and
contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than the oral
statements by the parties of what they intended it to mean.”). The plainmeaning rule precludes consideration of evidence of authorial meaning,
such as evidence of prior dealings between the parties and course of performance, when the relevant terms are unambiguous. See id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.
148. Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128, at 518; Gerhart, Contract
Law, supra note 3, at 145.
149. See Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128, at 518.
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intents (otherwise there would not be a dispute about the interpretation
of the contract) and the court will have to select between the different
meanings the parties claim they ascribed to terms in a writing.150 For
example, in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, the parties are unlikely to have
consciously thought about whether “Reading pipe” meant the brand of
pipe or the quality of pipe when the contract was made.151 And, if the
parties claim they did think about the matter, then they each will claim
they had their preferred meaning in mind.
The G–K proposal directs courts to ascribe the pragmatic or
purposive meaning to a term.152 Their proposal also directs courts to
try to resolve interpretive disputes by looking at limited objective
evidence.153 G–K predict that most interpretive issues can be resolved
this way because only one interpretation will be sensible. This commitment to trying to resolve interpretive disputes by looking at limited
objective evidence is in the spirit of the commitment of classical
contract law to objective meaning. Where G–K differ from the
stereotypical depiction of classical contract law is their adoption of
pragmatic or purposive meaning rather than semantic meaning.
The G–K proposal may well be the best way to handle problems of
interpretation. G–K make several empirical claims that, if true, would
make their proposal superior to an approach that ascribes the semantic
meaning to a term without regard to the reasonableness of the semantic
meaning in the context of a transaction. They claim textualism has a
high error rate and high claim-processing costs because “[t]extualism
invites ex post opportunism”154 and requires courts to “spend
considerable time reviewing textualist interpretations that have only
the flimsiest justification when evaluated on the basis of surplus
maximization.”155 G–K agree with Learned Hand that “There is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally.”156 And G–K
claim their approach has a lower error rate than textualism at comparable claim-processing costs. Claim-processing costs are relatively low
because the relevant “kind of contextual information is not likely to be
150. See id. at 518 n. 23, 545.
151. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).
152. G–K refers to this as the meaning that is more reasonable in light of the
parties’ apparent bargain. See Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128, at
544.
153. See id. at 539–40 (“Understanding each party’s goals, motivations and
likely decision making processes allows courts to understand . . . which
interpretation relies on empirical claims that are likely to be true and
which rely on empirical claims that seem too farfetched to be true without
a strong evidentiary foundation.”).
154. Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128, at 538–39.
155. Id. at 539.
156. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
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expensive to uncover or evaluate because most of it involves
uncontestable information that gives rise to no triable issues.”157 Error
rates are lower than textualism because “courts will understand how
the parties set up the exchange to get the most from the exchange,”
once courts understand “each party’s goals, motivations and likely
decision making processes.”158
The evidence G–K advance for these empirical claims is anecdotal.
To their credit, they try to back up their empirical claims with close
analysis of specific cases, including a case that is often presented as a
posterchild for textualism.159 For what it’s worth, my own experience is
consistent with their empirical claims. I have been involved in cases in
which a commitment to semantic textualism is associated with perverse
results.160
The G–K proposal is similar to how the New York Court of Appeals
handled problems of interpretation in commercial cases in the 1920s
and 1930s, which is good legal authority for this approach. Consider a
short opinion by Judge Cardozo in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent
Mills.161 The issue was whether a seller committed to deliver yarn for
$3.10 per box when its acceptance said that the price “is subject to

157. Gerhart & Kostritsky, supra note 128, at 539.
158. Id. at 540.
159. Id. at 559–65 (discussing Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971)).
160. My first close engagement as a participant in the interpretation wars was
writing an amicus brief with Robert W. Hamilton to the Texas Supreme
Court in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Industries, Inc., 907 S.W.2d
517 (Tex. 1995), urging the Court not to adopt a hard form of what Texas
lawyers call the four-corners rule to deny a liability insurance claim by a
literalistic interpretation of the “absolute pollution exclusion” clause in
the face of overwhelming evidence that the clause was meant to address
a different type of claim. Brief on behalf of Cooper Industries, Inc. on
Motion for Rehearing as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Industries, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995)
(No. D–4353). The Court did not change its decision, though it did revise
the opinion to allow courts to consider evidence of the “surrounding
circumstances” in deciding whether a contract is ambiguous. Compare
National Union, 907 S.W.2d at 521, with Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co v. CBI
Industries, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 332, 334 (Tex. Mar. 2, 1995), withdrawn
and superseded on rehearing. This qualification to the rule has developed
into an impressive body of case law and rules that would probably lead
to a different result in National Union. See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty.,
543 S.W.3d 755, 768 (Tex. 2018) (explaining surrounding circumstances
include “the commercial or other setting in which the contract was
negotiated and other objectively determinable factors that give a context
to the transaction between the parties” as well as “trade custom” and
“trade usage”) (quoting Houston Expl. Co. v. Wellington Underwriting
Agencies, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 462, 469 (Tex. 2011)) (emphasis added).
161. 172 N.E. 462 (N.Y. 1930).
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change pending tariff revision.”162 The seller argued there was no
commitment because it clearly reserved the power to change the price.163
Cardozo brushed this argument off, noting “the letters between plaintiff
and defendant were from one merchant to another. They are to be read
as business men would read them, and only as a last resort are to be
thrown out altogether as meaningless futilities.”164 He took judicial
notice of a debate in Congress over a tariff increase and explained that,
in this context, the qualification obviously meant the price was contingent on no tariff increase.165
Outlet Embroidery illustrates that courts can take a textualist
approach while ascribing a pragmatic meaning to contract terms with
little factual investigation when the necessary information is readily
available, and only one of the competing interpretations is reasonable
in light of this information.166 Classical contract law (as described by
the Restatement (First) of Contracts) actually allows a court to
consider a fair amount of information under the category of “surrounding circumstances.”167 This includes information about the commercial
setting of a contract and about trade custom and trade usage.168
Classical contract law imposes a semantic limit on “how far the words
will stretch, and how alien from the ordinary meaning of the words is
the intent they are asked to include.”169 Under classical contract law,
“buy” cannot be interpreted to mean “sell,”170 at least as a matter of
contract law. Under modern contract law, this is ok.171 But this type of
issue rarely arises because people rarely do business in code. In many
cases where a meaning is odd semantically, the oddity disappears once
the transactional context of a term is understood. G–K’s point is that
courts can resolve most such cases with limited evidence and a high
degree of confidence in the accuracy of an interpretation because usually
162. Id. at 462–63.
163. Id. at 463.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Lifshitz & Finkelstein, supra note 141, at 525, make this point.
167. Restatement (First) of Conts. § 235, cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1932).
168. Id. (“[E]ven to an agreement that on its face is free from ambiguity it is
permissible to consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying
circumstances at the time it was entered into—not for the purpose of
modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining
the meaning to be given to the agreement.”); see also id. § 230 (explaining
that what is excluded is evidence of prior dealings between the parties,
course of performance, and statements in negotiations).
169. Id. § 235 cmt. f.
170. Id. § 231 illus. 2.
171. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 212 illus. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
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only one argued-for meaning of a term will make sense once a
transaction is understood.

V. Reading Gerhart Alongside Benson
This Part places Gerhart’s account of contract law in the modern
landscape of contract law theory alongside Peter Benson, Justice in
Transactions.172 This pairing may seem odd because Gerhart and
Benson have very different theoretical aspirations. Gerhart aspires to
give an account of “the method of reasoning that persons ought to use
to determine their promissory behavior,” which he posits is the same
“method of reasoning that judges use to implement doctrine.”173 Benson
aspires to give an account of contract law that “is both internally
coherent and morally sound,”174 and that can serve as public
justification of contract law within a “broader framework of liberal
justice”175 that is committed to “the freedom and equality of the
parties.”176 Consistent with his justificatory goal, Benson takes on

172. Benson, supra note 12. Gerhart’s accounts of private law in general and
contract law in particular also share much in common with Lon Fuller’s
account of private law. Like Gerhart, Fuller explained much of private
law as institutionalized norms of human interaction. Compare Gerhart,
Contract Law, supra note 3, at 72, with Lon L. Fuller, Human
Interaction and the Law, 14 Amer. J. Juris. 1, 20–21 (1969). Like
Gerhart, Fuller believed the private-law system of adjudication was
capable of solving only fairly simple problems of corrective justice, and
that it was not capable of solving problems of distributive justice or
complex polycentric problems. Compare Gerhart, Contract Law,
supra note 3, at 86 (“[P]rivate, common law understands obligations to
be self-imposed, as a natural implication of the risks that arise from
choices.”), with Lon L. Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic
Freedoms—A Review of Robert L. Hale’s “Freedom through Law,” 54
Colum. L. Rev. 70, 81–82 (1954) (book review) (discussing correctivejustice limitations and advocating that the government should act to
address distributive-justice problems). Like Gerhart, Fuller defined the
field of problems that could be addressed by contract law expansively to
cover all “branch[es] . . . of the law having to do with the protection of
expectancies created by words or meaningful conduct . . . .” Compare Lon
L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1939) (book
review), with Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 86 (drawing a
parallel between “activity choices” in tort law and bargaining choices in
contract law).
173. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at xi.
174. Benson, supra note 12, at xi.
175. Id. at xii.
176. Id. at 2.
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contract law in its entirety and on its own terms. Gerhart’s methodological goal allows him to set aside much of contract law, including
rules he finds to be indeterminate177 or a proxy for other reasons.178
Despite these differences, I will argue their two accounts of contract
law complement each other. Both argue that at the heart of contract
law is a requirement that parties act reasonably within the parameters
of an agreed exchange. Benson situates the requirement of reasonableness within a larger theoretical account of contract law and private law.
While Benson’s account is theoretically rich, it largely treats people as
abstractions. Gerhart’s account of the requirement of reasonableness is
more empathetic and richer in analyzing individual cases. Their
accounts of contract law also share some oversights. Neither considers
how supplementary requirements for contract formation, like the
statute of frauds and the definiteness requirement, extend the domain
of independence and limited duty into contract formation. Neither
addresses the important disagreement within contract law over whether
the baseline contract is the parties’ agreement in fact or terms in a
writing the parties adopt as an expression of their agreement. More
generally, neither adequately addresses the tension created by treating
contract as a domain of reasonableness within a larger domain in which
people are independent and owe limited duties to each other.
Benson’s theory of contract is the current state of the art in moral
theories of contract law. In the United States, moral theories of contract
law begin with Charles Fried, Contract as Promise.179 In a 2012
retrospective, Fried explains he wrote the book in reaction to the “antiindividualist and anti-capitalist” accounts of contract law, and to
“assert the coherence of standard contract doctrine . . . based on a
morality of autonomy, respect for persons, and trust.”180 Much the same
could be said of Benson’s theory. A difference is that Benson targets
economic theories of contract, which largely postdate Fried’s book.
Within the field of moral theories of contract, Fried’s theory is described
as a promise theory while Benson’s theory is described as a transfer
theory.181
Like Gerhart, Benson’s theory starts from the premise that, as a
matter of private law, people are independent and owe limited duties
177. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at 3.
178. Id. at 112–16 (discussing formation doctrines).
179. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual
Obligation (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2015) (1981).
180. Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in Philosophical
Foundations of Contract Law 17, 18–20 (Gregory Klass, George
Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
181. For a succinct explanation of promise theories and transfer theories, the
relationship between the two types of theories, and a critical analysis of
both, see Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Choice Theory
of Contracts 25–40 (2017).
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to others. In Benson’s terms, a person is legally responsible only for an
act or omission that impairs someone’s exclusive rights “with respect
to her body or assets.”182 This premise poses a question for contract law
that Benson believes a transfer theory answers. This question is how
can a person subject herself to an obligation to another person by
making a promise she does not perform when non-performance does not
impair any right the promisee had before the promise was made?183
Benson finds an answer to this question in the existence of private
property and the need for a property owner to be able to transfer
property to another person to obtain something they desire from the
other person.184 On Benson’s account, an executory contract is similar
to a barter-exchange of property.185 The difference is that in an
executory contract each party acquires ownership of a right to the
performance promised by the other party. In a barter-exchange of property each party acquires ownership of property previously owned by the
other.
Benson and Gerhart’s accounts of contract law agree on several
important points. As noted, they share the premise that, as a matter of
private law, people are independent and owe limited duties to others.
They draw a similar conclusion from this shared premise, which is that,
when people make a contract, the agreed exchange defines their obligations.186 They also agree that contract law imposes a general duty on
parties to act reasonably within the framework of the agreed exchange.
Benson explains implied terms as applications of this requirement of
reasonableness: “Implication has to do with what a party can reasonably be held to presume of the other in the frame-work of their particular
transaction.”187 He continues: “In a sense, the parties may objectively
be viewed as having placed themselves under the protection of the
reasonable, trusting in the law’s articulation and upholding of it.”188
Like Gerhart, Benson endorses the requirement of good faith as “an
open and general framework norm of reasonableness available to develop legal responses to a wide range of issues, and requiring parties to act
with due regard for the contractually intended performance interests of

182. Benson, supra note 12, at 7.
183. Id. at 5–8.
184. Id. at 325–42.
185. Id. at 334–35.
186. Id. at 362–63; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
187. Benson, supra note 12, at 143.
188. Id. at 144.
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each other.”189 Both also conclude the doctrine of reasonable expectations follows from this requirement of reasonableness.190 I will come back
to this point.
The requirement of reasonableness makes a great deal depend on
the rules on contract formation, for these rules determine when and to
what the requirement of reasonableness attaches. Benson addresses the
main rules of contract formation at length. In his view, the requirement
of consideration works in tandem with the requirement of offer and
acceptance to specify “a definite kind of relation that is purely
promissory but that at the same time, being fully and intrinsically
bilateral, is distinct from the structure and normativity of the gratuitous promise.”191
Benson does not address formal requirements for contract that
supplement the requirement of consideration and the requirement of
offer and acceptance. The requirement of definiteness is one such formal
requirement for contract. Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever192
illustrates how the addition of a definiteness requirement complicates
the questions of when, and to what, the requirement of reasonableness
attaches. Under classical contract law, a court will not enforce a
contract, though the parties manifested an intent to make a contract,
when a material term is “unduly . . . indefinite.”193 This requirement
was applied in Academy Chicago Publishers to justify not enforcing a
contract despite the parties’ manifested intent to make a contract.
Franklin Dennis was a neighbor of the author John Cheever.194
When John Cheever died, Dennis approached a small Chicago
publisher, Academy, and Cheever’s widow, Mary Cheever, and negotiated a contract under which Franklin Dennis and Mary Cheever would
co-author a collection of John Cheever’s unpublished stories.195 Franklin
189. Id. at 157.
190. Id. at 215–40.
191. Id. at 102. Gerhart disagrees with Benson on this point. He downgrades
the fact that a promise is made as part of an exchange to one of several
factors that are relevant to the question of when a promisor has a legal
duty to consider the well-being of a promisee before rescinding a promise.
Gerhart would dissolve the rules of contract formation into a general rule
requiring a person to show appropriate regard for the well-being of another
when deciding whether to retract an apparent promise that altered the
other’s decision space. See supra notes 95, 119 and accompanying text.
Benson endorses the U.S. doctrine of promissory estoppel but he would
place the doctrine in tort law. Benson, supra note 12, at 73–74.
192. 578 N.E.2d 981 (Ill. 1991).
193. Id. at 983.
194. John Blades, Unfinished Business, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 31, 1992),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-12-31-9204280913story.html [https://perma.cc/XR9F-JQG4].
195. 578 N.E.2d at 982.
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Dennis was responsible for finding the stories.196 He found a treasure
trove of stories, and Mary Cheever reneged because she preferred to
have the entire trove published in a single book by a major publisher.197
The trial court gave Academy limited relief, declaring that Mary
Cheever could satisfy the duty of good faith and fair dealing if she
delivered ten to fifteen stories of her choosing totaling 140 pages.198
Academy appealed, wanting more.199 The Illinois Supreme Court held
the contract was unenforceable on the ground of indefiniteness.200
The trial court’s disposition of the case may not violate the
requirement of reasonableness within the agreed exchange that Gerhart
and Benson find in contract law. The argument that it does not is that
Mary Cheever only agreed to co-author a collection of John Cheever’s
unpublished short stories. Consistent with this agreement she could
have held out for the shortest and least valuable collection possible, for
this, she could argue, was the baseline to which she agreed.201 The
disposition of the case by the Illinois Supreme Court is impossible to
square with Gerhart and Benson’s requirement of reasonableness unless
one takes the position that the requirement of reasonableness attaches
only once an exchange reaches a fairly high level of completeness.
Benson’s transfer theory could easily encompass supplemental
formal requirements for contract, such as the definiteness requirement,
the mirror-image rule, and the statute of frauds.202 A barter-exchange
of tangible property is unlike an exchange of promises because tangible
property is a physical thing that someone can possess. A barterexchange of tangible property involves a transfer of possession, which
is complete, observable, and verifiable. An exchange of promises need
not be complete, observable, or verifiable. These supplemental requirements for a contract could be justified as responses to these differences.
The definiteness requirement makes a promise capable of ownership
only when a promise is sufficiently definite and complete. The mirror
image rule requires the parties to agree on what is being transferred,
eliminating one source of incompleteness. The statute of frauds requires
proof of visible evidence of a promise or a transfer. More generally, one
could argue that under a transfer theory of contract the paradigmatic
196. Id. at 983.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 984.
201. Whether this is the baseline to which the parties agreed is debatable.
Perhaps the baseline is a longer book with the best stories Dennis could
find.
202. Benson does not address these issues so it is not clear that he would
incorporate formal requirements for contract into his transfer theory. My
point is that one easily could.
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contract would be a debt instrument given in return for performance
rendered. A debt instrument literally is a property-like interest in the
hand of a holder.
There is an argument that these supplemental formal requirements
for contract follow from a principle both Gerhart and Benson accept.
This is the principle that, as a matter of private law, people are
independent and owe limited duties to each other. As explained earlier,
this principle is embodied in private law rules that privilege the
interests of a harm-doer over the interests of a harm-bearer in freedom
from harm when a harm is non-physical.203 This principle also is
embodied in equitable rules that provide only limited protection from
unfair advantage-taking of power-conferring rules in contract and property law.204 The supplemental rules on contract formation could be
explained as extending the domain of independence and limited duty to
contract formation. Rules like the statute of frauds and the definiteness
requirement resolve a disagreement about the existence of a contract in
favor of the party denying a contract, privileging her interest over the
interest of the party claiming a contract.
Or Benson might reject these supplemental formal requirements for
contract and insist that the only requirements for contract are
consideration plus offer and acceptance. I believe this is close to
Gerhart’s position.205 In eliminating these supplemental formal requirements for contract, Gerhart and Benson could take the position that
people’s independence from unchosen contractual obligation is adequately protected by other rules that give people the unilateral power
to avoid being under a contractual obligation. The rules on offer and
acceptance give a person communicating about a prospective contract
the unilateral power to reserve discretion whether to make a contract
by clearly stating that a communication solicits an offer and is not an
offer. It is as simple as saying “Would you like to make me an offer?”
A person negotiating a contract has the unilateral power to reserve the
power to back out for any reason by clearly stating that formation of a
contract requires execution of a final agreement, and that they are
under no obligation until this is done.206 Contract law may require that
203. See supra Part II(B).
204. See supra Part II(A).
205. A difference in their position is Gerhart would also weaken the presence
or absences of consideration to only being a factor that is considered in
deciding whether a contract has been made. As noted earlier, modern
contract law points in this direction, for it weakens the requirement of
definiteness and the statute of frauds. Modern contract law also weakens
the consideration requirement.
206. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp., Inc. 873 F.2d 155
(1989) (describing letter that stated that it was subject to approval by
the boards of directors of both parties “whose discretion shall in no way
be limited.”).
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a person who wants to reserve this power clearly communicate this
intent to another person. But it does not require they obtain the consent
or agreement of someone with whom they negotiate for them to have
this power.207 Once this power is reserved, there is no requirement of
reasonableness in its exercise, and no duty to consider the well-being of
the other person, so independence is preserved.
These supplemental formal requirements are one solution to a
practical problem. Contract formation cannot be determined in a
straightforward way by establishing a few simple rules of expression—
like the rules on offer and acceptance—and then sitting back and relying
on people to use these rules to express their intent. The problem is
people often do not conform their conduct to simple rules of expression.
Often it is unclear in applying simple rules of expression whether people
intended to make a contract or the terms on which they agreed.
If the definiteness requirement and the statute of frauds were
eliminated, then the presence of indefinite material terms and the
absence of a signed writing would remain important factors in deciding
whether there has been an offer and acceptance when communications
are ambiguous. And they would remain important factors in deciding
in an ambiguous case whether an agreement preliminary to execution
of a written contract is a legal nullity, a promise to negotiate in good
faith, or a contract that will be memorialized in the executed document.
The effect of eliminating these requirements is that the absence of a
signed writing or the presence of material indefinite terms would not be
a basis for dismissing a claim under a more or less bright-line rule
focused solely on this fact. Instead, these would be factors to be
considered alongside other factors in applying simple rules of expression.
The supplementary formal requirements for contract are not the
only formal rules of contract law that Gerhart and Benson slight. They
say nothing about the parol-evidence rule. This is a telling oversight,
for the classical form of the parol-evidence rule rests on a premise that
is at odds with the premise of their argument for the reasonableexpectations doctrine. Gerhart and Benson assume the baseline agreed
exchange to which the reasonableness requirement attaches is the
parties’ agreement in fact. If you accept this assumption, then boilerplate terms in a form contract should be subject to the requirement of
reasonableness because a form-taker does not actually agree to these
terms.
Under the classical form of the parol-evidence rule, the agreed
exchange is the terms in a writing the parties adopt as an expression of

207. Compare what is required to negate a potential obligation to pay for
benefits received in the law of restitution. This requires the agreement of
the other party. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 5 (Am. L. Inst. 2011).
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their agreement.208 A term on which the parties actually agree is discharged if the term does not appear in the writing, if the term would
ordinarily be in such a writing.209 Importantly, under the classical form
of the parol-evidence rule, a court does not consider the strength of the
evidence showing that the parties intended the term to be part of the
agreed exchange.210 A court is instructed to discharge a term if it would
ordinarily be in the writing.211 Thus, in Mitchill v. Lath212 the seller’s
promise to the buyer of an expensive country retreat to move an
unsightly icehouse on neighboring property was held discharged even
though the court conceded this promise was part of the parties’ agreed
exchange.213 Judge Andrews observed that in applying the parolevidence rule, the court was “not dealing . . . with [the seller’s] moral
delinquencies,” it was achieving “the purpose behind the rule . . .
[n]otwithstanding injustice here and there.”214 This purpose is to confer
on a party to a contract the power to use a writing to determine the
terms of an agreed exchange by obtaining the other’s assent to the
writing as an expression of an agreement.215
The so-called duty-to-read rule also serves this purpose.216 Under
the duty-to-read rule, a person who adopts a writing as an expression
of an agreement is treated as having assented to all of the terms of the
writing, even if the person has not (and even if they could not) read

208. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 213 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
209. Id. § 216(1) & cmt. d.
210. See id. § 216 cmt. d (“[E]vidence of the consistent additional terms is
admissible unless the court finds that the writing was intended as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.”).
211. Id. § 216(1) & cmt. d.
212. 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
213. Id. at 649–50.
214. Id. at 646–47.
215. The different positions of Corbin and Williston on whether a judge could
consider extrinsic evidence in deciding whether a parol agreement was
discharged because it was not included in a written instrument can be
attributed to a disagreement over whether the parol evidence rule serves
an evidentiary purpose or formal purpose. Williston took the position that
a judge should not consider extrinsic evidence in applying the rule, which
suggests the rule is intended to serve a formal purpose. Corbin took the
position that a judge should consider extrinsic evidence in applying the
rule, which suggests the rule is intended to serve an evidentiary purpose.
John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol
Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J.
333, 337–39 (1967).
216. This is a poor name for the rule because people generally do not, and are
not expected to, read writings they adopt as an expression of an
agreement.
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the terms of the writing.217 The duty-to-read rule makes a term in a
writing part of a contract even though there is no actual agreement to
the term. The parol-evidence rule excludes a term not in a writing from
a contract, even though there is actual agreement to the term, when
the term would normally be included in such a writing. Under both
rules, the terms of an agreed exchange are determined by the writing
the parties adopt as an expression of their agreement and not by the
parties’ actual agreement.
Like other power-conferring rules, the parol-evidence rule and the
duty-to-read rule are subject to weak equitable safeguards. A person
cannot take advantage of another person’s mistake about the contents
of a writing if they are responsible for the mistake (generally meaning
they knew or had reason to know of the other party’s mistake).218 There
is a large gap between this rule and the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The doctrine of reasonable expectations negates a term in a form
if the form-maker would predict the form-taker would reject the contract, if the form-taker was aware of the term.219 Equity negates a term
in a form if the form-maker knows or has reason to know the form-taker
has objected to the term.220
The shaky legal foundation of Gerhart and Benson’s argument for
the reasonable-expectations doctrine is a bigger challenge to Benson
than it is to Gerhart because of Gerhart’s more modest theoretical
aspirations. Gerhart aspires to explain the method of other-regarding
required in a contract when there is a duty to engage in other-regarding
reasoning. He does not aspire to provide a theory that explains when a
duty of other-regarding reasoning exists. This could be determined by
convention, by policy-based reasoning, or by stipulation. Benson aspires
to provide a theory that explains all of contract law using principles
derived from contract law and without the need to refer to values
external to contract law such as efficiency, fairness, and distributive
justice.221
It is hard to see how principles derived from contract law can
resolve the disagreement between modern contract law and classical
contract law over what the baseline agreed exchange to which the
requirement of reasonableness attaches is.222 One would have to show
217. Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 223 (3rd Cir. 2008).
218. Sisneros v. Citadel Broad. Co., 142 P.3d 34, 40–41 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
219. Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 211(3) & cmt. f (Am. L. Inst.
1981).
220. Id.
221. Benson, supra note 12, at xi.
222. Robin Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin argue that “[r]egardless of
one’s normative theory of contract, the central focus of justification is on
the enforcement of common terms that parties agree to when they form
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that one definition of the baseline agreed exchange was so inconsistent
with the rest of contract law that it could be rejected as a misfit.
Classical contract law and modern contract law also disagree on
whether there should be strong supplemental formal requirements for
contract, like the statute of frauds and the definiteness requirement.
Again, it is hard to see how principles derived from contract law can
resolve this disagreement.
Critics of moral theories of contract have argued that moral theories
are incapable of resolving these sorts of issues. Hanoch Dagan and
Michael Heller refer to this as the “irrelevance thesis”223 This challenge
was first made by Richard Craswell to Fried’s promise-theory of
contract.224 The challenge is “that because promise-keeping relies on a
plastic or malleable social convention—one that need not take any
particular form or have any specific content—it is (almost) irrelevant
to contract law.”225 Transfer theories run into the same problem, Dagan
and Heller observe, for “[n]either the range of transferability, nor even
its inclusion within the scope of an owner’s entitlement, is selfdefining. . . . There is no inevitable content to the concept . . . and no
arbitration among the different available conceptions is possible
without pre-commitment to some normative apparatus.”226 This
critique focuses on the definition of the “range” and “scope” of what is
transferable by contract.227 A similar point could be made about the
ability of a transfer theory to resolve the specific form of a transfer.
Benson does not claim that transfer theory resolves these issues, so
we must dig a little deeper to see if his account of contract law is subject
to the irrelevancy challenge. Benson looks to contract law to define the
basic range and scope of what is transferable by contract. He also looks
to contract law to define the basic form of a transfer. Benson extracts
moral principles from contract law and then uses those moral principles
to develop and evaluate more fine-grained details of contract law. His
treatment of implied terms illustrates. Benson responds to Craswell’s
argument that an autonomy-based theory of contract (such as Benson
offers) is “wholly content-neutral and therefore . . . cannot offer any
guidance at all as to which terms, if any, should be implied . . . [and]
contracts.” Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 Harv. L.
Rev. 1135, 1138 (2019). Kar and Radin do not explain why an autonomy
theory of contract could not make the baseline agreement terms in a
writing parties assent to as an expression of their agreement. Nor do they
address the shaky legal foundations of this premise.
223. Dagan & Heller, supra note 181, at 23–24.
224. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 529 (1989).
225. Dagan & Heller, supra note 181, at 23.
226. Id. at 36.
227. Id.
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must therefore refer to other, mainly instrumentalist, nonpromissory
grounds.”228 Benson claims the requirement of reasonableness within the
framework of the agreed exchange has the capacity to “guide the when,
what, and how of implication.”229 He also claims this method of deriving
and explaining implied terms is superior to other methods because it
“reflects the fundamental normative nature of contractual rights and
obligations.”230
Benson may well be right that the requirement of reasonableness is
a good basis for filling gaps in contracts once the parameters of the
agreed exchange are set. But the requirement of reasonableness cannot
determine the existence or parameters of an agreed exchange. Thus the
question is whether the normative principles that Benson extracts from
contract law can determine the parameters of the agreed exchange?
Benson’s normative principles may be able to do some of this work,
but they cannot do all of the work that needs to be done. Consider two
debates involving U.C.C. § 2-207 and the “battle of the forms.” One
debate concerns how to apply § 2-207 when two companies make a
contract by an offer with terms on an accompanying form and an
apparent acceptance with additional or different terms on an
accompanying form.231 Under the mirror-image rule in classical contract
law, the apparent acceptance is treated as a counter-offer.232 When the
original offeror performs or accepts performance, this is treated as
assent both to a contract and to the terms on the form accompanying
the apparent acceptance. This is called the last-shot rule.233 Section 2207(2) was drafted to change this result.234 It treats an apparent
acceptance as assent both to a contract and to the terms on the form

228. Benson, supra note 12, at 129 (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 130. Gerhart makes a similar claim about the efficacy of the
requirement of reasonableness as a tool for filling gaps in a contract as
compared to gap-filler rules. Gerhart, Contract Law, supra note 3, at
126–31.
230. Benson, supra note 12, at 132.
231. Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1343 (1997), elegantly states
the points made in this paragraph. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle
of the Forms in Action, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2678, 2681–82 (2000), offers a
different perspective and reviews other reform proposals.
232. Keating, supra note 231, at 2683.
233. Id. at 2684.
234. Id. at 2685.
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accompanying the original offer.235 This is called the first-shot rule.236
There is a good argument that both approaches are wrong and that the
appropriate solution in such cases is to make the baseline agreement
terms to which the parties actually agree plus those on which the forms
agree.237 A term that appears in only one form becomes part of the
contract only if the term is reasonable within the parameters of the
agreed exchange.238 This solution is possible once the parties’ baseline
agreement is defined as the terms on which the parties actually agree
plus the terms on which their forms agree.
The other debate concerns whether to apply § 2-207 to what is
called a “shrink-wrap agreement.” Under the majority rule in the
United States, a purchaser of a good manifests assent to terms on a
form enclosed within the good’s packaging so long as the purchaser is
clearly told they have the power to reject the good by returning the
item.239 Keeping the good is treated as legally equivalent to signing the
form.240 Importantly, the rule in § 2-207(2)(b) does not apply to protect
a purchaser from a term in a form that materially alters the contract.241
The validity of the majority rule on shrink-wrap agreements in the
United States cannot be determined by applying the requirement of
reasonableness, for the rule is a formation rule that determines the
terms of the agreed exchange. The majority rule on shrink-wrap
agreements is similar to other rules in contract law that look to a
writing parties adopt as an expression of their agreement, and not to
the parties’ agreement in fact, to determine the terms of an agreement.
The requirement of reasonableness cannot resolve these debates
because the requirement can be applied only once the agreed exchange
is determined. More generally, the requirement of reasonableness cannot
determine when people are in a contractual relationship because this
would expand the domain of contract (and the requirement of
reasonableness), which would shrink the domain in which people are

235. Section 2-207(2) gives the offeror the upper hand by treating a purported
acceptance as an acceptance of the offer with additional (and perhaps
different) terms in the acceptance becoming part of the contract only if
the terms do not “materially alter” the contract. An offeree can avoid this
rule by making a counter-offer or an “expressly . . . conditional”
acceptance so a contract is not formed under § 2-207(1). U.C.C. § 2-207
(Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1977).
236. Keating, supra note 231, at 2688.
237. This is the rule in U.C.C. § 2-207(3) when a contract is not formed under
§ 2-207(1).
238. This result is achieved by applying the materially alter test in § 2-207(2)(b)
to both forms.
239. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1068–70 (R.I. 2009).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1070.
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independent and owe limited duties to others. This is not just a
theoretical possibility. If a claim for negligent misrepresentation was
allowed for representations regarding prospective contracts, then people
would be less independent, and they would owe greater duties to others,
when they communicate regarding a prospective contract.
The principles of autonomy Benson extracts from contract law are
capable of resolving some issues in this area. They can explain a rule
about which there is no debate. This is the rule that for there to be a
valid shrink-wrap agreement a buyer must be given an opportunity to
return a good, if the buyer does not assent to terms and conditions
enclosed in a good’s packaging. This must be the rule for if it was not
a seller would have the power to impose terms on a buyer. Benson’s
principles also are capable of resolving the debate about the relative
merits of the last-shot rule, the first-shot rule, and the rule in U.C.C.
§ 2-207(3) in the basic battle of the forms case. In this case, both parties
proceed with a transaction while transmitting a writing that demands
that any contract is on their terms and conditions. I believe Benson’s
principles require the rule in U.C.C. § 2-207(3) in this case for only this
rule treats the two parties as equals.
But I do not think Benson’s principles are capable of resolving the
debate over the application of the materially alter test in U.C.C § 2207(2)(b) to a shrink-wrap agreement. His principles cannot prevent a
person from demanding that assent to a transaction is assent to terms
on their form as the baseline of the agreed exchange. To deny people
this power would violate their autonomy. Nor can Benson’s principles
preclude a person from having the power to accept a contract on terms
in a form they choose not to read. Imposing this restriction would
violate a form-taker’s autonomy, which surely includes the power to
make a contract on terms the form-taker chooses not to read. But a
rule that gives effect to unread terms violates the autonomy of other
form-takers who surely have the power to make a contract without
having to read a form that people are expected not to read to ensure
the form does not contain terms to which they object.
To be clear, this is not a defense of the majority rule in the United
States on shrink-wrap agreements. The only point I am making here is
that the validity of the rule cannot be determined by principles derived
from contract law, by the requirement of reasonableness, or by Benson’s
principles of autonomy. The validity of the rule can only be determined
by what my colleague and co-author, Melvin Eisenberg, describes as
social propositions that relate to efficiency, fairness, and distributive
justice.242

242. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Foundational Principles of Contract Law
5–6 (2018).
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Conclusion
When Peter asked me if I would organize a panel on his new book
on contract law for a conference in February 2020, I readily agreed. I
had read his book on tort law and was interested in reading what he
had to say about contract law. As one does, I used the occasion to say
something about his book that I wanted to say anyway. This is that
moral theories of contract present a misleadingly idealized view of how
contract functions as an institution. Moral theories describe contract as
“promise,”243 “consent,”244 “collaboration,”245 and “empowerment.”246 All
good things. The title of Peter’s book, “Contract Law and Social
Morality,” has a similar vibe. The cover photo of two people working
together to climb a rock has the same vibe. Benson’s title, “Justice in
Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law,” also has this vibe.
The point I made then is that we might provide a more accurate
view of contract law as an institution if we emphasized the association
of contract with debt. If we were more emphatic about the association
of contract with debt, then we would treat legal rules on debt collection
as part of the law of remedies. Rather than talking about the morality
of promise-keeping we would talk about the morality of default and
collection. And we might even talk about the difference between debts
owed by entities that shield the wealth of their owners from claims and
debts owed by individuals. Relatedly, I speculated whether we might
provide a more accurate view of contract law and property law
together—i.e., of the basic rules of private ordering—if we emphasized
the concept of a “legal instrument” as the most basic building block of
private ordering in our world. The traditional property course focuses
on ownership and use rights in real resources (i.e., land and chattels).
Most of the wealth people hold is represented by legal instruments.
Much of this wealth is mediated through debt instruments that give
the rentier class claims against the labor income of the debtor class.
I chose not to use this article to make these points for this would
slight Gerhart’s contribution in identifying and fleshing out a
requirement of reasonableness that runs through much of private law.
Gerhart is right. Much of private law is just a command that people
treat other people reasonably. Gerhart is also right that, insofar as
private law is concerned, this requirement of reasonableness does not
apply to people’s use of their wealth or to the exercise of power created
by social hierarchies. Not surprisingly, treating contract as a domain of
243. Fried, supra note 179, at 1.
244. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
269, 269 (1986).
245. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1419, 1420
(2004).
246. Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 761
(2016).
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reasonableness within a larger domain of liberty and limited duties to
others creates a tension within contract law. I cannot fault Gerhart for
downplaying aspects of contract law that enable people with power to
use the law to pursue their own ends with little regard for the wellbeing of people without power. It was Peter’s optimism about people
and society that enabled him to capture the melody of reasonableness
that runs through much of private law.
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